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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Allen Jeske appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Hutchison observed a truck driving with a non-functioning headlight.
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 17 – p. 38, L. 23;1 see also Ex. 1.) Officer Hutchison stopped the
truck. (Id.) Officer Hutchison identified Jeske as the driver of the truck. (6/7/16 Tr., p.
58, L. 19 – p. 59, L. 13.) When Officer Hutchison approached the truck, Jeske delayed in
responding to Officer Hutchison. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 59, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 4.)
Officer Hutchison informed Jeske that he had stopped him because of a nonfunctioning headlight and asked Jeske for his paperwork. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 61, L. 5 – p. 62,
L. 2.) Jeske indicated that he had an expired driver’s license. (Id.) Jeske fumbled with
his paperwork and dropped his registration. (Id.) Instead of handing the paperwork to
Officer Hutchison, Jeske held the paperwork out in the air behind him without turning
around. (Id.) Officer Hutchison thought this was “bizarre.” (Id.)
When Jeske spoke, his speech was mumbled and he intermittently slurred his
words. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 62, L. 19 – p. 63, L. 5.) Jeske’s eyes were glassy, he had a

1

The transcript of the trial is broken up into several volumes. “6/6/16 Tr.” and “6/7/16
Tr.” are citations to the volumes labeled “Jury Trial Volume I of II” and “Jury Trial
Volume II of II.” “6/7/16 Verdict Tr.” is a citation to the volume labeled “Verdict Parts II
& III.” “6/6/16 Voir Dire Tr.” is a citation to the volume labeled “Jury Voir Dire [and]
Opening Statements.” “6/7/16 Closing Tr.” is a citation to the volume labeled “Jury
Instructions & Closing Arguments.”
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lethargic facial expression, “a thousand-yard stare,” and appeared excessively relaxed.
(Id.)
Officer Hutchison asked Jeske to exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 65, L. 8 – p. 67, L. 19.) Jeske refused to do field sobriety tests. (Id.)
During this interaction, Officer Hutchison smelled the odor of alcohol and noticed that
Jeske swayed slightly when he was standing. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 9-25.) Jeske
continued to refuse to do field sobriety tests and eventually turned his back to Officer
Hutchison and placed his own hands behind his back. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 65, L. 8 – p. 67, L.
19.)
At the jail, Officer Hutchison gave Jeske an opportunity to take a breath test.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 73, L. 19 – p. 79, L. 16.) Jeske refused. (Id.) Officer Hutchison also
asked Jeske if he would provide a blood sample. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 80, L. 20 – p. 81, L. 4.)
Officer Hutchison then explained that he would get a warrant from a judge if Jeske did
not consent. (Id.) Jeske did not respond to Officer Hutchison’s request for a blood draw.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 84 , L. 25 – p. 85, L. 15.)
Officer Hutchison got a warrant for a blood draw. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 84 , L. 25 – p.
85, L. 15.) At the hospital a nurse drew Jeske’s blood. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 85, L. 19 – p. 88,
L. 10.)
The state charged Jeske with felony DUI because Jeske had previously been
convicted of felony DUI. (R., pp. 40-44.) The state also charged Jeske as a persistent
violator. (Id.)
On January 26, 2016, the parties agreed to continue the preliminary hearing
because they were waiting on a “lab report that is coming in next week that will probably
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resolve this issue.” (R., p. 53.) Pursuant to some plea negotiations, on February 5, 2016,
Jeske waived a preliminary hearing. (R., p. 54.) The state filed an Information. (R., pp.
56-57.)
On February 24, 2016, the state received the results of the blood draw. (R., pp.
143-144.) The blood test showed Jeske had a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.182.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-14.) The defense also received the results of the blood draw on
February 24, 2016. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-23.)
Jeske filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress evidence on the
grounds the arrest was unlawful, there was no basis for the field sobriety tests, a Miranda2
violation, and there was no probable cause for the warrant. (R., pp. 60-79.3) The state
responded. (R., pp. 121-133.)
The district court held a hearing on Jeske’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 117-120.)
The district court first ruled that the motion to suppress was timely, except as to the
warrant issue because the actual motion did not mention the warrant issue and the
memorandum in support was filed after the deadline for motions had passed. (6/1/16 Tr.,
p. 12, L. 6 – p. 15, L. 15.) At the hearing, Officer Hutchison testified, and the state
presented a video recording of the stop and the interactions. (6/1/16 Tr., p. 16, L. 8 – p.
53, L. 3.) The district court suppressed Officer Hutchison’s question to Jeske, “Have you
had a beer?” finding it was a custodial interrogation prior to Miranda warnings, and even

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Jeske’s filing is titled “Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress” however the
actual Motion to Suppress does not appear in the record. (See R., generally.) According
to the Register of Actions a “Motion to Suppress” was filed on March 18, 2016 (R., p. 3),
and the district court indicated that a Motion to Suppress was filed “almost two months”
before the Memorandum. (6/1/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 3 – p. 13, L. 9).
3

3

though Jeske did not respond to the question, the district court suppressed evidence of the
question itself. (6/1/16 Tr., p. 68, L. 3 – p. 69, L. 23.) The district court denied the
reminder of Jeske’s motion to suppress. (6/1/16 Tr., p. 69, Ls. 20-23.)
Prior to trial, the state moved to amend the Information to include the alternate
“per se theory” that Jeske had been operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol
concentration of .08 or above. (R., pp. 143-145.) The district court recognized the issue
as within its discretion and granted the motion to amend the Information because the
defense had the BAC test results since February, and the Idaho Criminal Rules permit the
state to amend a charge up until it rests at trial. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 – p. 13, L. 4.)
The district court also found that the Amended Information was not adding a new charge,
but rather an alternate way to prove the same charge. (Id.) The state filed an Amended
Information. (R., pp. 149-151.)
Jeske moved in limine to redact portions of the video recording of the stop. Jeske
moved to have Jeske’s and Officer Hutchison’s discussion about Jeske’s failure to have a
driver’s license redacted from the video.4 (6/6/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 20, L. 23.) Jeske
also asked to redact the portions of the video showing Jeske refusing the field sobriety
and breathalyzer tests. (Id.)
The state indicated it had already redacted all of the conversations regarding an
interlock device and references to Jeske’s criminal records. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p.
20, L. 23.) The state argued that the discussion regarding Jeske’s failure to have a license

4

The discussion occurs on the video taken from Officer Hutchison’s body camera,
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, file labeled 1068014.wmv at approximately 2:05-2:52.
4

was relevant and not prejudicial because Jeske indicated that he did not have a license for
monetary reasons, not that it was suspended for DUI. (Id.)
The district court asked the parties to provide case law regarding whether the
video should be redacted. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 20, L. 24 – p. 24, L. 19.) The state provided
case law that refusing the alcohol tests can be admitted as evidence of consciousness of
guilt. (Id.) The district court denied Jeske’s motion to redact either the refusals or the
conversation about the driver’s license. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 23, L. 23 – p. 24, L. 19.)
At the jury trial (R., pp. 152-155, 159-173) Officer Hutchison testified regarding
Jeske’s behavior and speech that indicated he was intoxicated. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 59, L. 14 –
p. 63, L. 5). The nurse who drew Jeske’s blood, Ashley Jean Miller, testified. (6/7/16
Tr., p. 119, L. 22 – p. 128, L. 8.) Mr. Johnston, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State
Police Laboratory, testified. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 129, L. 9 – p. 151, L. 6, p. 158, L. 21 – p. 160,
L. 2.) The blood test showed Jeske had a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.182.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-14.)
Near the close of evidence, defense counsel requested that the district court give a
jury instruction informing the jurors that Jeske had a constitutional right to refuse field
sobriety tests and breath alcohol testing, but which would allow jurors to consider Jeske’s
refusal as evidence. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 152, L. 20 – p. 155, L. 4; R., pp. 156-158.) The
district court agreed to give this instruction. (Id.; 6/7/16 Closing Tr. p. 9, Ls. 3-8.) Jeske
also moved to add language to ICJI 1006 – Degree of Intoxication Not Necessary,
requiring the evidence of intoxication be “noticeable” or “perceptible.” (6/7/16 Tr., p.
156, Ls. 12-25; see
also R., p. 138.) The district court denied Jeske’s request to add
- --language to the approved ICJI instructions. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 157, Ls. 1-5.)

5

The jury found Jeske guilty of DUI.

(6/7/16 Verdict Tr., p. 6, Ls. 10-19.)

Following a court trial, the district court found that Jeske had been previously convicted
of felony DUIs in 2007 and 2010, and thus Jeske was guilty of felony DUI. (6/7/16
Verdict Tr., p. 8, L. 12 – p. 12, L. 6.) The district court also found that Jeske was a
persistent violator. (Id.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Jeske to
fourteen years with seven years fixed. (R., pp. 220-222.) The district court retained
jurisdiction. (Id.) Jeske timely appealed. (R., p. 223-227.)
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ISSUES
Jeske states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Whether the district court allowed evidence of Mr. Jeske’s refusal
to consent to a blood draw in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
and in direct contravention of clear Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
II.
Whether the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to
amend the information on the morning of trial because doing so prejudiced
Mr. Jeske’s constitutional rights to due process and a preliminary hearing.
III.
Whether the district court erred by refusing to give the requested
instruction that, to be guilty of DUI under an impairment theory, the
impairment must be “noticeable” or “perceptible.”
IV.
Whether the district court erred when it allowed the State to
present evidence of other uncharged misconduct under a res gestae
analysis since that evidence is not admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
V.
Whether the accumulation of errors in this case requires reversal
even if this Court determines them all to be individually harmless.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Jeske failed to preserve his argument that the district court should
have excluded evidence of his refusal to take the blood test?
Has Jeske failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
2.
granted the state’s motion to amend the information and has he failed to show he was
prejudiced by the amendment?
3.
Has Jeske failed to show the district court erred when, in accordance with
Idaho precedent, it gave the approved jury instruction regarding intoxication?
4.
Has Jeske failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to redact a portion of the video wherein Officer Hutchison and Jeske
discuss Jeske’s driver’s license?
5.

Has Jeske failed to show error, much less cumulative error?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Jeske Did Not Move The District Court To Exclude Evidence Of The Blood Draw And
Thus The Issue Is Not Preserved For Appeal
A.

Introduction
Jeske moved the court redact portions of the video recording showing his refusal

to perform the field sobriety tests and the breathalyzer. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-21.)
The district court denied Jeske’s motion to redact the video. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 23, L. 23 – p.
24, L. 9.) However, on appeal Jeske argues the district court erred by not excluding all
evidence of his refusal to take the blood test. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) Jeske did
not raise this issue before the district court and therefore it is not properly preserved for
appeal.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009)
(citations omitted). In reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s]
whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court
acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3)
the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason.” Id. at 51, 205 P.3d at
1187 (citations omitted); accord State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582,
590 (2010). “However, an abuse of discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial
right is not affected. In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will
grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”
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Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
C.

Jeske Did Not Raise The Admissibility Of His Refusal To Take The Blood Draw
Before The District Court
On the morning of trial, Jeske moved to redact portions of the video wherein

Jeske refused to perform the field sobriety test or consent to a breath test because the
evidence “was not relevant to the charge of whether he is driving under the influence or
not.” (6/6/16 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-21.) The state responded that Jeske’s refusals were
relevant because they were evidence of consciousness of guilt. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 18, L. 25 –
p. 19, L. 20.) Jeske responded that refusals cannot be used as consciousness of guilt and
it would amount to using his silence against him. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-18.)
The district court asked the parties to provide case law. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 20, L. 24 –
p. 24, L. 19.) The state provided case law that refusing the alcohol tests can be admitted
as consciousness of guilt. (Id. (citing State v. Martinez-Gonzales, 152 Idaho 775, 275
P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012); Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 65 P.3d 534 (Ct. App. 2003);
State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348 (Ct. App. 2012).) The district court denied
Jeske’s motion to redact the portions of the video. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 23, L. 23 – p. 24, L. 9.)
On appeal, Jeske argues the district court erred by admitting evidence of his
refusal of blood draw, arguing, “[b]ecause that refusal constitutes an invocation of the
Fourth Amendment protections, that refusal cannot be admitted as evidence of
consciousness of guilt.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-6) (citing State v. Christiansen, 144
Idaho 463, 470, [163 P.3d 1175, 1182] (2007).) While it is not entirely clear on what

9

standard of review Jeske relies on appeal,5 Jeske’s appellate argument nevertheless fails
because it was not preserved and, even if preserved, any error was harmless.
Jeske’s oral motion only addressed video recording of his refusal to perform the
field sobriety tests and the breathalyzer. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-21.) Jeske did not
move to redact the video to remove evidence of his refusal to take the blood draw or to
generally exclude all evidence of his refusal to take the blood draw. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p.
15, Ls. 14-20 (“[B]ut there is a video about where [Officer] Hutchison approaches Mr.
Jeske and asks him to perform the field sobriety test and the breathalyzer, and both of
those were refused, and those are not relevant to the charge of whether he is driving under
the influence or not.”); p. 20, Ls. 8-17 (“[A]nd the refusal of the field sobriety test and the
breathalyzer, there is contradicting case law on whether that can be used as consciousness
of guilt…and he did not verbally refuse the breathalyzer[.]”); p. 23, Ls. 7-10 ([T]he
defendant has the right to refuse field sobriety and/or the request to take the
breathalyzer[.]”). However, on appeal, Jeske challenges the general admission of his
refusal to take the blood draw. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.) This is beyond the scope
of Jeske’s motion to redact from the video evidence of his refusal to take the field
sobriety tests and the breathalyzer.
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the
parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3 (Idaho June 14, 2017)

5

Jeske does not address the abuse of discretion standard of review for the admission of
evidence nor does he explicitly address the three prongs of the discretionary standard of
review. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-6.)
10

(citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho
793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119,
124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968))
(“We have held generally that this court will not review issues not presented in the trial
court, and that parties will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”). While
the district court did include the blood draw in its oral ruling regarding redacting the
video6 (see 6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 5-9), Jeske never moved the court to decide the issue of
whether his refusal to take the blood test was admissible or present the theory that such
evidence was inadmissible. The only issue raised by Jeske was whether his refusals to
take the field sobriety tests and breathalyzer should be redacted from the video. Jeske did
not raise the admissibility of his refusal to take the blood test before the district court and
does not claim the alleged error was fundamental. Therefore it should not be considered
here on appeal.
However, if the issue is considered on appeal, Jeske still fails the fundamental
error test. In order to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error:
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly
exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical

6

While an adverse ruling can form the basis for the assignment of error on appeal, the
district court’s ruling on the blood draw was superfluous and not necessary to the actual
motion raised by Jeske and thus cannot form the basis for an appeal. See State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 482-483, 348 P.3d 1, 97-98 (2014) (“Although the district
court, in an abundance of caution, provided a ruling on this issue, Abdullah withdrew his
request for the gasoline samples to be sent to Lentini. Thus, the district court’s ruling was
not necessary and cannot form a basis for appeal.”)
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decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961,
980 (2010). Jeske potentially meets the first prong of the fundamental error test. Recent
Idaho and United States Supreme Court decisions have clarified Fourth Amendment
protections regarding the right to refuse a blood draw. See Birchfield v. North Dakota,
___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2184-2185 (2016) (“[W]e conclude that a breath test, but
not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
driving.”); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, ___ (2013); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho
416, 418-419, 337 P.3d 575, 578-579 (2014). It is improper to introduce evidence at trial
inferring a defendant’s guilt from the assertion of a Fourth Amendment right.

See

Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470, 163 P.3d at 1182. Therefore evidence of a refusal of a
blood draw is likely inadmissible and the previously “well established” Idaho law “that a
defendant’s refusal to perform alcohol concentration testing is generally admissible in a
DUI case” (see State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 251, 335 P.3d 586, 591 (Ct. App. 2014)) is
no longer good law as it pertains to a refusal for a blood draw.

Refusal to take

breathalyzer tests or field sobriety tests, however, remain admissible because there is no
right to refuse those tests under the Fourth Amendment See,
e.g.,
Birchfield v. North
- - ------------Dakota, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. at 2184-2185; State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, 45-46, 355
P.3d 1266, 1275-1276 (2015); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 480-481, 988 P.2d 700,
706-707 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 56-57, 175 P.3d 216, 218-219 (Ct.
App. 2008). Thus, evidence of a refusal to participate in field sobriety tests and breath
tests would be admissible, but evidence of a refusal to consent to a blood draw would not,
and Jeske likely meets the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.
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Jeske fails the second prong of the fundamental error analysis. To show that the
error “plainly exists” Jeske must show that “existing authorities have unequivocally
resolved the issue in the appellant’s favor.” State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 372, 256
P.3d 776, 780 (Ct. App. 2011); -see --also ----------State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375-376, 271
P.3d 1227, 1231-1232 (Ct. App. 2012).

Here, the existing authorities have not

unequivocally resolved admissibility of a refusal to take a blood test. The decisions
clarifying the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the right to refuse a blood draw,
are all very recent. It would not have been clear to the district court that the “well
established” Idaho law “that a defendant’s refusal to perform alcohol concentration
testing is generally admissible in a DUI case” would no longer be good law as it pertains
to blood draws. The error did not plainly exist from the record.
Jeske also fails the third prong of the fundamental error analysis. In order to meet
the third prong of the fundamental error analysis, “the defendant must demonstrate that
the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it
must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.3d at 978. Here, evidence of Jeske’s refusal of the blood draw did not affect the
outcome of the trial. Officer Hutchison testified that Jeske’s behaviors indicated potential
intoxication, including Jeske’s delay in responding to Officer Hutchison. (6/7/16 Tr., p.
59, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 4.) Officer Hutchison testified that Jeske’s speech was mumbled and
intermittently slurred. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 62, L. 19 – p. 63, L. 5.) Jeske’s eyes were glassy, he
had a lethargic facial expression, and a “little bit of a thousand-yard stare,” and he
appeared to be excessively relaxed. (Id.) These are all indicators of intoxication. (Id.)
Further, Jeske refused to perform the field sobriety tests and the breath test, and Jeske
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does not challenge the admission of these refusals on appeal. (See 6/7/16 Tr., p. 65, L. 8
– p. 67, L. 19, p. 73, L. 23 – p. 79, L. 16; Appellant’s Brief, pp. 4-6.) The state also
introduced video evidence of Jeske’s behavior during the stop. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 40, L.
19 – p. 41, L. 23; Ex. 1.) Most importantly, the blood draw showed Jeske had a blood
alcohol concentration level of 0.182, which was well above the legal limit of 0.08. (See
6/7/16 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-14.) Even if the evidence of the refusal to submit to a blood
draw was inadmissible to demonstrate Jeske’s consciousness of guilt, that consciousness
of guilt is inconsequential in light of the evidence the test in fact showed a BAC of 0.182.
Thus, any error was harmless because it did not contribute to the verdict.
II.
The District Court’s Decision To Allow The Amended Information Was Not An Abuse
Of Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the state to amend

the Information to include the “per se theory” of DUI. Adding the “per se theory” did not
constitute charging an additional or different offense. The “per se theory” is not a
separate offense, but one way to prove the same offense of DUI. Nor were Jeske’s
substantial rights prejudiced because, among other things, Jeske had been in possession of
the blood draw results for months prior to trial.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to allow the State to amend an Information is a matter within the

discretion of the trial court. State v. Tribe, 126 Idaho 610, 611-612, 888 P.2d 389, 390–
391 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982)). In
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reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s] whether: (1) the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the
outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial court
reached its decision through an exercise of reason.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at
1187 (citations omitted).
“In exercising this discretion, the trial court must be sure that no substantial rights
of the defendant are prejudiced.” Tribe, 126 Idaho at 611-612, 888 P.2d at 390–391
(citing LaMere, 103 Idaho at 842, 655 P.2d at 49). “In the absence of a showing of
prejudice arising from the amendment, the filing of an amended information does not
constitute error.” Id. (citing LaMere, 103 Idaho at 842, 655 P.2d at 49; State v. Owens,
101 Idaho 632, 619 P.2d 787 (1980)). “The defendant bears the burden of showing
prejudice resulting from the amendment.” Id. (citing State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 57,
740 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Ct. App. 1987)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Permitted The State To
Amend The Information And Jeske Has Failed To Show Prejudice Resulting
From the Amendment
The district court granted the state’s motion to amend the Information to add the

“per se theory” of DUI. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 – p. 13, L. 4.) The district court found
there was no prejudice because the defense had the BAC test results since February,
approximately four months before trial. (Id.) The district also found that the Amended
Information was not adding a new charge, but rather an alternate way to prove the same
charge. (Id.)
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On appeal, Jeske argues the district court erred because DUI is a “multiple-means
offense” and adding a “per se theory” prejudiced Jeske’s due process rights because he
was deprived of “adequate notice of the manner in which he was alleged to have violated
the law and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense thereto.”7 (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 6-13.) Jeske also argues that the amendment to the Information “prejudiced Mr.
Jeske’s state constitutional and statutory right to a preliminary hearing on those new facts
and new theory of liability.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) Both of Jeske’s arguments
are without merit.
1.

The “Per Se Theory” And “Impairment Theory” Are Not Different
Offenses And Jeske Was Not Prejudiced By The Amended Information

Under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e) the court may permit the filing of an amended
information at any time before the prosecution rests, so long as “no additional or different
offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” I.C.R.
7(e). Jeske argues that DUI is a “multiple-means” offense and the “per se theory” and the
“impairment theory” for proving DUI are different offenses and, thus, the district court
erred in granting the motion to amend under Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e). (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 8-10.)
Jeske’s argument is contrary to Idaho precedent. The “per se theory” and the
“impairment theory” are not separate offenses. State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 681-682,
718 P.2d 589, 592-593 (Ct. App.1986); see also State v. Cheney, 116 Idaho 917, 919, 782
P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 1989) (“We have previously held that Idaho’s DUI statute does not

7

Jeske does not articulate the standard of review he believes should govern the appellate
court’s review of his argument. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-13.)
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embody separate crimes for driving while under the influence and driving with a specified
blood-alcohol content.”). The DUI offense as codified in I.C. § 18-8004(1) “has been
interpreted as establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation.” State v.
Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005) (citing State v. Garrett, 119
Idaho 878, 881–82, 811 P.2d 488, 491–92 (1991); Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589).
Contrary to Jeske’s separate offenses created by “multiple-means” argument, the “per se
theory” and the “impairment theory” are two ways of proving the same offense, and not
separate offenses. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
determined that the state’s amended information did not charge a new offense under
Idaho Criminal Rule 7(e).
Nor was Jeske prejudiced by the amendment because Jeske already knew of the
blood draw and the results of the blood draw. “A defendant … cannot legitimately claim
that he was surprised to his substantial prejudice by the absence in the information of
specific details relating to an offense where those details are already known to the
defendant or provided to the defendant by a means other than through the language in the
information.” State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151, 75 P.3d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citing State v. Gumm, 99 Idaho 549, 552, 585 P.2d 959, 962 (1978)).
In State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 841, 655 P.2d 46, 48 (1982), the defendant
was charged with rape under Idaho Code § 18-6101. The information alleged facts which
fell under Idaho Code § 18-6101(3) and (4), which cover forcible rape.

Id.

No

allegations regarding the victim’s age were included in the Information and no allegation
was made that the crime fell under § 18-6101(1), which prohibited intercourse with a
female under the age of eighteen years, sometimes referred to as “statutory rape.”

17

Id.

One day before the trial started, the state amended the Information to include facts
regarding the victim’s age to allege a violation of § 18-6101(1). Id. The jury found the
defendant guilty of statutory rape under § 18-6101(1). Id. The defendant appealed and
argued, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the
Information to be amended to allege statutory rape one day before trial. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court observed that even though the amended Information
was filed shortly before trial, the defendant had been aware that the victim was under the
age of eighteen. Id. at 842, 655 P.2d at 49. The parties had discussed a potential plea to
statutory rape at the preliminary hearing. Id. In addition, the defendant did not claim that
he could have disputed the victim’s age. Id. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to amend the
Information to include statutory rape the day before trial. Id.
Because the defendant had been aware of the victim’s age before the filing
of the amendment and did not make a claim that he could have disputed
her age, we find the defendant’s rights were not prejudiced from the
amendment, and therefore, there was no abuse of discretion.
Id.; --see --also ---------State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 55-60, 740 P.2d 1039, 1041-1045 (Ct. App.
-1987) (defendant not prejudiced by the amendment to information charging him with
statutory rape where he had notice of the victim’s age).
The same is true here. Jeske was aware his blood was drawn because he was
present when it was drawn. (See 6/7/16 Tr., p. 85, L. 19 – p. 88, L. 10.) The parties
discussed the potential results of the blood draw on January 26, 2016, the date originally
scheduled for a preliminary hearing. (R., p. 53 (The parties agreed to continue the
preliminary hearing because they were waiting on a “lab report that is coming in next
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week that will probably resolve this issue.”).) The defense was provided with the results
of the blood draw on February 24, 2016. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 17-23.) The jury trial
started on June 6, 2016 – more than three months after Jeske received the results of the
blood draw. (See id.; R., pp. 152-155.) The jury instructions requested by the state on
May 26, 2016, included the “per se theory” instructions. (R., pp. 88-89, 99, 103-104,
114.). Jeske did not argue to the district court that the blood draw or results were
erroneous, but instead claimed that he did know the name of the nurse who drew his
blood and did not have her credentials. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 14-21.) Thus, like in
LaMere, there was no prejudice to the defendant because the defendant was aware of the
facts underlying the Amended Information well in advance of trial and did not have a
basis for challenging those facts. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the state’s motion to amend the Information.
2.

The Amended Information Did Not Prejudice Jeske’s Right To A
Preliminary Hearing

The Amended Information did not prejudice Jeske’s right to a preliminary
hearing.

Jeske argues “allowing the late amendment prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s state

constitutional and statutory right to a preliminary hearing on those new facts and new
theory of liability.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.) Jeske argues that amending the DUI
charge to include the “per se theory” of DUI, changed the “nature” of the charge for
which he was bound over. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13 (citing State v. Palmer, 138
Idaho 931, 936, 71 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ct. App. 2003).) Jeske’s argument is misplaced.
A defendant has a right to a preliminary hearing when the complaint alleges that
Defendant has committed a felony. State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 388, 234 P.3d 707,
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712 (2010) (citing State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, 463-64, 105 P. 1047, 1050 (1909);
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 8; Idaho Code § 19–804; Idaho Crim. R. 5.1)). “The purpose of the
preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed a felony.” Id. “A defendant who waives the right to a preliminary
hearing waives the right to a probable cause determination regarding the charged felony.”
Id. “If the complaint charges a felony and the defendant waives the preliminary hearing,
the State can file an information charging the felony alleged in the complaint, or a crime
that constitutes an included felony offense.” Stewart, 149 Idaho at 388, 234 P.3d at 712
(citing State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249–50, 796 P.2d 121, 126–27 (1990)).
Here, Jeske was charged by complaint with felony DUI, specifically that Jeske
committed the crime of “OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, Felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 19-2514[.]”
(R., p. 46.) After discussions with the state regarding a potential resolution, and the
pending lab results, Jeske waived his preliminary hearing.

(R., pp. 53-54.)

The

magistrate entered an order holding Jeske to answer and noting Jeske waived his
preliminary hearing for the charge of “COUNT 1 – DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE - (THIRD OR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE) - [§] 18-8004.” (R., p. 55.)
As set forth above, the only issues at a preliminary hearing are whether there is a
probable cause to believe a felony was committed and probable cause to believe the
defendant committed it. The “nature” of the crime (the exact method of commission) is
not an issue decided at preliminary hearing, because the method of commission is not
decided the preliminary hearing, Jeske’s argument is irrelevant. Even if relevant, the “per
se theory” did not change the “nature” of the DUI charge. As explained above, the “per
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se theory” and the “impairment theory” are not separate offenses. See Knoll, 110 Idaho at
681-682, 718 P.2d at 592-593; Cheney, 116 Idaho at 919, 782 P.2d at 42. Idaho Code
§ 18-8004(1) is one crime with two ways of proving a violation. See Robinett, 141 Idaho
at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. The nature of the crime did not change; the nature of the crime is
still a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1).
Nor does the case cited by Jeske help his argument. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 12
(citing Palmer, 138 Idaho at 936, 71 P.3d at 1083).) After the district court ordered a new
trial, Palmer was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine and had a preliminary
hearing on that charge. Palmer, 138 Idaho at 933, 71 P. 3d at 1080. During the second
trial the state amended the information and changed the amount of methamphetamine
from 28 grams or more to an amount exceeding 400 grams. Id. After a mistrial, and
another trial, the jury found Palmer guilty. Id. at 933-934, 71 P.3d at 1080-1081. “On
appeal, Palmer claim[ed] that the district court did not have jurisdiction over his third
trial because the second amended information charged a greater or different offense for
which no preliminary hearing was held.” Id. at 936, 71 P.3d at 1083. The Idaho Court of
Appeals rejected Palmer’s argument and held that the applicable trafficking statute
“defined a single offense of trafficking in methamphetamine while providing for varying
sentences depending on the amount of methamphetamine involved.” Id. at 937, 71 P.3d
at 1084. Even though the amended Information increased Palmer’s potential mandatory
minimum sentence, a preliminary hearing was unnecessary because the offense charged
was the same. See id. The same is true for Jeske. He waived his preliminary hearing on
the charge that he committed a DUI under to Idaho Code § 18-8004 and the amendment
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did not change that offense. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted
the state’s motion to amend the Information to include the “per se theory.”
III.
The District Court Did Not Err When It Gave The Approved Jury Instruction Regarding
Intoxication
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Jeske’s motion to add language to ICJI 1006 – Degree of

Intoxication Not Necessary. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 155, L. 19 – p. 157, L. 5.) On appeal, Jeske
argues the district court erred by denying his motion. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)
Jeske’s appellate argument has already been rejected by Idaho precedent. See State v.
Lewis, 126 Idaho 282, 882 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1994). Jeske’s proposed language was
also redundant and already covered by other instructions.

Finally, Jeske was not

prejudiced by the denial of his requested instruction.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009).
“An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error when the instruction misled
the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the instruction.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the
instructions, ‘considered as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the
applicable law, then no error [has been] committed.’” Id. (citations omitted).
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C.

Jeske Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Amend The Jury Instruction Approved By The Supreme Court
Jeske proposed several jury instructions. (R., pp. 134-139.) Near the close of

evidence Jeske objected to portions of the jury instructions the court indicated it intended
to give. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 152, L. 17 – p. 156, L. 25.) These objections included the request
that the court add this sentence to the ICJI regarding intoxication: “The influence must be
noticeable or perceptible and impair a physical or mental function that relates to one’s
ability to drive.” (6/7/16 Tr., p. 156, Ls. 12-25; see also R., p. 138.) The district court
denied Jeske’s request to add this sentence to the approved ICJI instructions. (6/7/16 Tr.,
p. 157, Ls. 1-5.)
The district court gave Instruction No. 18:
To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, it is not
necessary that any particular degree or state of intoxication be shown.
Rather, the State must show that the defendant had consumed sufficient
alcohol and/or intoxicating substances to influence or affect the
defendant’s ability to drive the motor vehicle.
(6/7/16 Closing Tr., p. 9, Ls. 13-19.) This instruction is in accordance with approved ICJI
1006. See ICJI 1006 – Degree of Intoxication Not Necessary. On appeal, Jeske argues
the district court erred when it gave this instruction.8 (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)
Jeske’s appellate argument fails. The district court properly instructed the jury.
A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of

8

Jeske does not articulate the standard of review he believes should govern the appellate
court’s review of his jury instruction argument. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)
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law necessary for the jury’s information.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430
(citing I.C. § 19-2132).

“This necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and

elements of the crime charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence
that has been admitted.’” Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922
(Ct. App. 2004)). It also includes, when requested, instructions on “every defense or
theory of the defense having any support in the evidence.” State v. Turner, 136 Idaho
629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323,
328, 986 P.2d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999)). Although “[e]ach party is entitled to request the
delivery of specific instructions,” “such instructions will be given [only] if they are
‘correct and pertinent.’” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 192132). “A proposed instruction is not ‘correct and pertinent’ if it is (1) an erroneous
statement of the law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) ‘not supported
by the facts of the case.’” Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31 (citing
State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)).
Jeske argues that his proposed language, that intoxication must be “noticeable” or
“perceptible,” is a correct statement of law. See Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (citing State v.
Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 804 [172 P.2d 555, 559] (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Andrus, 118
Idaho 711, 714-715 [800 P.2d 107, 110-111] (Ct. App. 1990). This argument has already
been rejected in Lewis, 126 Idaho 282, 882 P.2d 449.
In Lewis, the defendant argued that Andrus required an “an instruction that the
driving impairment was ‘discernable,’ ‘noticeable’ or ‘perceptible.’” Id. at 284-285, 882
P.2d at 451-452. The Lewis Court rejected this argument and held the proper jury
instruction for impairment does not include the “discernable,” “noticeable” or
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“perceptible” language. See id. The Court of Appeals noted the Idaho Supreme Court
has held that “[t]he proper jury instruction for the crime of driving under the influence
can be found in State v. Glanzman, 69 Idaho 46, 202 P.2d 407 (1949).” Lewis, 126 Idaho
at 284, 882 P.2d at 451 (citing State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 844 P.2d 691, 695
(1992).)
To constitute this crime, it is not necessary that the driver of the motor
vehicle be shown to have been in any particular degree or state of
intoxication, but only that such driver at the time charged had consumed
intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to influence or affect his driving of
the motor vehicle.
Glanzman, 69 Idaho at 49, 202 P.2d at 408. This instruction is essentially the same
instruction outlined in ICJI 1006 and given by the district court in this case. (See 6/7/16
Closing Tr., p. 9, Ls. 13-19.) The jury instruction given by the district court was the
correct statement of the law.
Even if the proposed instruction was also a correct statement of the law, the
additional language Jeske proposed was adequately addressed in the other instructions.
The impairment instruction given by the district court instructed that “the State must
show that the defendant had consumed sufficient alcohol and/or intoxicating substances
to influence or affect the defendant’s ability to drive the motor vehicle.” (6/7/16 Closing
Tr., p. 9, Ls. 13-19.) Thus, the state had to present evidence that alcohol was influencing
or affecting Jeske’s ability to drive his truck. This evidence would necessarily include the
officer’s testimony about his observations and the video showing Jeske’s behavior. As a
result, any evidence of Jeske’s impairment would necessarily have to be “noticeable or
perceptible.” The proposed instruction is simply redundant and potentially confusing to
the jury.
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Because the instruction given was a correct statement of the law and Jeske’s
proposed additional language was adequately covered by other instructions the district
court did not err in declining Jeske’s requested instruction.
Even if Jeske were able to show the district court should have given his additional
instruction, the record shows no prejudicial error.

“An erroneous instruction is

prejudicial when it could have affected or did affect the outcome of the trial.” Garcia v.
Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 543, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (2007) (citing Burgess v. Salmon River
Canal Co. Ltd., 119 Idaho 299, 306, 805 P.2d 1223, 1230 (1991)). Here, the “noticeable”
or “perceptible” instruction would not have affected the outcome of the trial because the
jury already had to find Jeske’s impairment was noticeable or perceptible in order to find
Jeske was impaired.

Further, the blood test showed Jeske had a blood alcohol

concentration level of 0.182, well above the legal limit, and an additional impairment
instruction would not have affected or changed that result.
The district court did not err by denying Jeske’s motion to change the ICJI, and
even if the district court erred, Jeske was not prejudiced.
IV.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Jeske’s Motion To
Redact From The Video The Conversation Regarding Jeske’s Driver’s License
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Jeske’s motion to redact a portion of the video wherein

Officer Hutchison and Jeske discuss Jeske’s driver’s license. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1019.) On appeal, Jeske argues the district court erred because the doctrine of res gestae is
no longer recognized in Idaho and the challenged portion of the video was inadmissible
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I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-19.) Both of Jeske’s arguments
are inapplicable.
The recorded interaction between Jeske and Officer Hutchison was relevant
because Jeske’s behavior during the traffic stop, including his responses regarding his
driver’s license, was evidence of whether he was impaired or not impaired. Further, the
challenged portion of the video was not prejudicial, let alone unfairly prejudicial. The
district court did not abuse its discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse

of discretion standard.” State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449, 450, 375 P.3d 279, 280 (2016)
(citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163–64, 45 P.3d 816,
819–20 (2002)). “‘To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within
the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.’” Jones, 160 Idaho at 450, 375
P.3d at 280 (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d
816, 821 (2000)).
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C.

Jeske Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Ruling
That Jeske’s Response To Officer Hutchison’s Question Regarding A Driver’s
License Should Not Be Redacted
Officer Hutchison’s body camera recorded the interaction with Jeske. (See Ex. 1.)

Jeske moved to have the portion of the interaction regarding Jeske’s failure to have a
driver’s license redacted from the video. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 20, L. 23.)
Officer Hutchison’s body camera recorded the following interaction:
Officer Hutchison:

I just need to see your driver’s license next, sir.

Jeske: Uh, I don’t have one. Don’t have one.
Officer Hutchison:

I’m sorry.

Jeske: Don’t have one.
Officer Hutchison:

You don’t have a driver’s license?

Jeske: No.
Officer Hutchison:
had one? Or …

Oh, okay. Is it suspended, or have you just never

Jeske: It’s a expired and I just never [inaudible]
Officer Hutchison:

You never renewed it?

Jeske: [inaudible]
Officer Hutchison:
drink tonight?

Thank you sir. Mr. Jeske have you had anything to

Jeske: Nope.
Officer Hutchison: No? I’m sorry I couldn’t hear you?
Jeske: No. No.
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(See Ex.1 at 2:05-2:52.9)
The district court denied Jeske’s motion to redact this portion of the video, ruling:
It appears that the other issues with respect to the question about the
driver’s license, the response is not prejudicial. Mr. Jeske did not give a
reason, such as he had a suspended driver’s license, you know, for other
reasons, and I do find that it is sufficiently intertwined with other issues
that it would be – that is also goes to reasonable suspicion and probable
cause.
(6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-24.) On appeal, Jeske argues the district court erred by denying
the motion to redact the video.10 (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-19.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion. The video evidence of Officer
Hutchison and Jeske’s interaction regarding the driver’s license was relevant and not
unduly prejudicial. Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in
the case, and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it
would be without the evidence is relevant. I.R.E. 401; State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544,
547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may
be excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho
469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905,
908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App.

9

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 is a compact disc with several video files. This citation is to the file
labeled 1068014.wmv. The transcription is based upon undersigned counsel’s review of
that video.
10
Jeske does not articulate the standard of review he believes should govern the appellate
court’s review of his argument; instead he simply states the district court erred. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-19.)
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1993). “The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in
original). Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in
the sense of being detrimental to a party’s case. See State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290,
775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (”Certainly that evidence was prejudicial to the defendant,
however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably admitted to prove the
case of the state, and thus results in prejudice to a defendant.”). Rather, the rule protects
only against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a
decision on an improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As long as the
evidence is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant’s character and its
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the probability
of unfair prejudice, it is not error to admit it. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978
P.2d 227, 230 (1999).
The entire interaction between Officer Hutchison and Jeske was relevant
evidence. Among other things, one of elements of the crime is that Jeske was impaired.
To prove that element, the state relied, in part, on evidence of Jeske’s interaction with
Officer Hutchison. The video evidence shows how Jeske responded and acted, and that is
evidence that goes to whether he was impaired or not impaired. In this case, it appears
that Jeske’s responses and behavior during the driver’s license questions led Officer
Hutchison to ask Jeske if he had been drinking. (See Ex.1 at 2:05-2:52.) This video
evidence was relevant.
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that Jeske’s
responses were not prejudicial. As noted by the district court, Jeske did not give a reason
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why he did not have a license. (6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-17.) Jeske did not say his license
was suspended for a prior DUI or any other nefarious reason. (See Ex.1 at 2:05-2:52;
6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-17.) This evidence is not prejudicial, let alone so unfairly
prejudicial that it would be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 403.
On appeal, Jeske argues the district court erred because Idaho no longer
recognizes the doctrine of res gestae and the discussion regarding the driver’s license was
inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-19.) Both of Jeske’s
arguments fail.
Jeske’s res gestae argument is misplaced for two reasons. (See Appellant’s brief,
pp. 17-19 (citing State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 388 P.3d 583 (2017).) First, the
district court did not rule the evidence was admissible under res gestae, nor did the
parties argue res gestae. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 24, L. 17.) Second, the res
gestate doctrine, as explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, was an exception to the
hearsay rule. See Kralovec, 161 Idaho at ___, 388 P.3d at 587-588. The quote utilized by
Jeske on appeal, regarding res gestate as justification for admitting evidence in close
temporal proximity to the charged offense, was a quote by the district court, not the
Supreme Court. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 17, n.3 (citing Kralovec, 161 Idaho at ___, 388
P.3d at 587).) After the Idaho Supreme Court cited the district court’s understanding of
res gestae, the Court went on to explain that res gestae was actually a “convenient
vehicle” to escape from the hearsay rules. Kralovec, 161 Idaho at ___, 388 P.3d at 587588 (quoting 2 McCormick On Evid. § 268 (7th ed.)).
[T]he phrase res gestae served as a convenient vehicle for escape from the
hearsay rule in two primary situations. First, it was used to explain the
admissibility of statements that were not hearsay at all. Second, it was
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used to justify the admissibility of ... (1) statements of present sense
impressions, (2) excited utterances, and (3) statements of present bodily
condition, mental states, and emotions.
Id. (quoting 2 McCormick On Evid. § 268 (7th ed.)). The Court then explained that the
concept of res gestae had been incorporated, and encompassed by, Idaho Rules of
Evidence 803(1)-(3), the codified hearsay exceptions of present sense impression, excited
utterance and then existing mental, emotional or physical condition. Id. Thus, explained
the Court, res gestae used to be a hearsay exception, but it is no longer applicable as such.
The issue in this case has nothing to do with hearsay or its exceptions. Jeske appears, like
the district court in Kravolec, to misapply the doctrine formerly known as res gestae. The
holding of Kralovec is simply inapplicable to this case.
Jeske also argues that the video evidence of the driver’s license interaction is
inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) Jeske’s 404(b)
argument is likewise inapplicable because the recorded conversation about the driver’s
license was not evidence admitted to prove Jeske’s character. “Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show the
person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). Jeske argues that his failure to
have a driver’s license is character evidence because it shows he is “disregarding the
rules.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 19.) According to the video, Jeske simply did not
renew his driver’s license. (See Ex.1 at 2:05-2:52.) As the district court pointed out,
Jeske’s response to the question did not give a reason why he did not have a license. (See
6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-17; Ex.1 at 2:05-2:52.) Even if neglecting to renew a driver’s
license but driving anyway reflected on Jeske’s character for ignoring rules regarding
driver’s licenses, there is no basis for concluding driving under the influence would be an
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act in conformity with such character. Simply put, driving without a license does not
establish propensity to drive under the influence. Rule 404(b) is simply inapplicable.
Even if Rule 404(b) was somehow applicable, the evidence would still be
admissible. Evidence of Jeske’s response, and slurring or lack thereof, is relevant for
another purpose,11 as explained above, to prove or disprove whether Jeske was impaired,
and the district court ruled that his response was not prejudicial because he did not give a
reason why did not have a license. (See 6/6/16 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 10-24.)
Even if was error not to redact Jeske’s responses to Officer Hutchison’s question,
it was harmless. “Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously
objected to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.” State v.
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 222,
245 P.3d at 974). “If the Court finds that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting or excluding the evidence, then the Court must declare a belief beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial, in order to find that
the error was harmless and not reversible.” Id. (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-228, 245
P.3d at 979-980). “[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the
same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation omitted).
As explained above, Officer Hutchison testified that Jeske exhibited numerous
signs of intoxication, including, that Jeske’s speech was mumbled and intermittently
slurred, and that his eyes were glassy. (6/7/16 Tr., p. 59, L. 14 – p. 60, L. 4, p. 62, L. 19 –

11

Rule 404(b) states that character evidence may be admissible for “other purposes, such
as…” While it is not listed as an example of an “other purpose” evidence that helps
either prove or disprove an element of crime should fall under the “other purposes”
purposes exception.
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p. 63, L. 5.) Further, Jeske refused to perform the field sobriety tests and the breath test.
(6/7/16 Tr., p. 65, L. 8 – p. 67, L. 19, p. 73, L. 23 – p. 79, L. 16.) The blood draw showed
Jeske had a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.182, which was well above the legal
limit of 0.08. (See 6/7/16 Tr., p. 150, Ls. 10-14.) The district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Jeske’s motion to redact the video, but even if it did, any error
was harmless because the error did not contribute to the verdict.
V.
Jeske’s Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because He Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less
Multiple Errors To Cumulate
Jeske argues the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal of his convictions.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 20.) Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors,
harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.
“However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more
than one error.” State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) (quoting
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008)). Because Jeske has failed
to show any error, there is no error to cumulate in this case. Alternatively, even if errors
in the trial had been shown, they would not amount to a denial of due process that would
require reversal. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of
errors deemed harmless). Jeske has failed to show cumulative error.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm Jeske’s conviction.
DATED this 23rd day of August 2017.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson__________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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